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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RON J. VILLENEUVE and 
BEVERLY VILLENEUVE, 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) 
) CASE NO. 17343 
PHILIP D. SCHAMANEK, 
) 
) 
) 
) Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 
5th day of September 1980, which Judgment foreclosed Respon-
dents' mortgage on the real property which is the subject 
of this action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request this Court to either dismiss the 
appeal for mootness or affirm the Summary Judgment and to 
award Respondents their attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
0 n this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Objections to Appellant's Factual Statements. 
Initially, Respondents do not believe the following 
factual statements made by Appellant are accurate: 
1. Appellant states (P. 2) that by letter dated 
December 18, 1979, Respondents declared the entire unpaid 
balance under the contract immediately due and payable 
This statement is incorrect. The December 18, 1979 lettu 
gave notice that unless the amounts in default were paid 
within ten days, Respondents would declare the entire amounc 
due. 
2. Appellant states (P. 7) that as of December, 
1979, Appellant was maintaining fire insurance on the premisd 
I 
I There is absolutely no evidence to support this assert~n 
and Appellant does not cite any such evidence in the record I 
I 
B. Respondents' Statement of Facts. I 
On or about March 30, 1978, pursuant to a Uniform Rea: I 
, I 
Estate Contract, Respondents sold the real property which 15 I 
the subject of this action, which is improved with a duplex 
1 
I 
and is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, to Thad H. Brown I 
I 
and Paula Brown (R.34). On or about August 31, 1979, all oi 
1 
the purchasers' interest under the Uniform Real Estate Cont:'! 
was assigned to Appellant (R. 36). Appellant did not norifv , 
Respondents of this Assignment or of any address at which he i 
could be contacted (R. 33&79). The Assignment recited that 
Appellant's address was 7040 So. Campus Drive, Salt Lake(': 
Utah 84121 (R.36). 
-2-
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In late September or October, 1979, Respondent 
Beverly Villeneuve was informed by a third party that 
Appellant and Gail Schamanek had received an assignment 
of the purchasers' interest in the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract. In the middle of October 1979, when Respondents had 
not received the first monthly payment of $487.70 due from 
Appellant, she telephoned Defendant Gail Schamanek to inquire 
about the payment. Mrs. Schamanek told Mrs. Villeneuve at 
that time that she was glad she had called because Mrs. 
Schamanek did not know where to send the payment and that 
Hrs. Schamanek would send the payment out immediately. A few 
days later Respondents did receive the first and only payment 
ever made on the Uniform Real Estate Contract by Appellant. 
The check for the payment was signed by Gail Schamanek and 
the address on the check was 7040 So. Campus Drive, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, the same address listed for Appellant on the 
Assignment (R.79). Thereafter, Appellant defaulted by failing 
to pay the November and December monthly payments, and taxes 
and insurance due on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, even 
though Appellant was receiving approximately $600.00 a month 
in rents from the property and Respondents were required to 
keep paying a monthly payment of approximately $370.00 on 
an underlying Trust Deed to prevent the beneficiaries from 
foreclosing on the property (R.32-38). 
-3-
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By letter dated December 18, 1979 (R. 37), Respondents 
gave notice to Appellant that unless the sums needed to 
bring the contract current were paid within ten days, that 
Respondents would elect pursuant to paragraph 16C of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to treat the contract as a note 
and mortgage, pass title subject thereto and declare the 
entire unpaid balance immediately due and payable. This lett, 
was addressed to Appellant Philip Schamanek and Gail Schaman,, 
7040 So. Campus Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, because 
that was the address which was listed on the check for the 
October payment, Gail Schamanek had held herself out to 
Respondents as an owner of the property, and Respondents 
believed that she was Philip Schamanek 's wife (R. 33&79). 
When Appellant still had failed to make any payments after Ju 
days to bring the contract current, a second letter was sent 
by Respondents dated January 18, 1980 (R. 39), giving notice 
that Respondents had elected to treat the Uniform Real Estatt 
Contract as a note and mortgage, pass title subject thereto 
and declare the entire unpaid balance immediately due and 
payable. Respondents also enclosed a Warranty Deed in the 
name of Appellant and Gail Schamanek as grantees (R. 23) · Th; 
letter was also sent to the Campus Drive address. Gail 
Schamanek admittedly received both notices and called Respon· 
dents' attorney during the latter part of January and first 
part of February to talk about the contract (R.15&16). 
Defendant Gail Schamanek at all relevant times held 
herself out to Respondents as an owner of the property (R J] 
-4-
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She was the only person with whom Respondents communicated 
concerning the property (R.33) and she made the only payment 
that was made by Appellant on the Property (R.79). The fire 
insurance policy which was obtained by the Schamaneks on 
the subject property some time in 1980 (a copy of which 
was mailed to Respondents), listed Gail Schamanek, not Appellant, 
as the insured under the policy (R.82&83). At no time have 
Respondents been informed of the address for Appellant, so 
the only way they had to contact him was at the Campus Drive 
address (R.79). 
On or about January 25, 1980, Respondents commenced 
this action to foreclose their mortgage on the subject 
property. A copy of the Summons and Complaint was served 
at the Campus Drive address on February 16, 1980 (R. 5). No 
responsive pleading was filed and on or about March 19, 1980, 
a Default Judgment was entered ordering that the subject 
property be sold at Sheriff's Sale (R. 9). The Defendants 
subsequently moved to set aside the default on the basis 
that the Summons and Complaint had not been properly served 
(R.11). Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the Court 
granted such motion (R.18). This was the first time that 
Respondents were informed that Defendant Gail Schamanek had 
not received any interest in the subject real property and 
that Appellant Philip Schamanek was the sole assignee of 
:he purchasers' interest. 
-5-
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Thereafter, and on or about April 28, 1980, RespondeD'. 
filed an Am.ended Complaint seeking to foreclose their mortga;, 
on the subject real property as against Appellant only. Tt, 
Am.ended Complaint also sought reformation of the Warranty 
Deed previously given by Respondents to Appellant and Gail 
Schamanek to delete Gail Schamanek as a grantee (R.20). 
On or about May 15, 1980, Respondents filed a motion 
in District Court to have a receiver appointed for the subje;: 
property pursuant to the terms of the contract between t~ 
parties (R. 40). At the hearing on this motion, Appellant's 
counsel offered to tender into Court all sums required to 
bring the contract current and to thereafter pay all monthb 
payments into Court during the pendency of the action if the 
Court would deny the motion to appoint a receiver. Based 
upon the stipulation of the parties at the hearing, the Gour: 
entered an Order giving Appellant 20 days in which to make 
I 
the payments into Court and providing that in the event thes, I 
payments were not paid into Court, a Receiver would be 
appointed to manage the property during the pendency of the 
action (R. 47). Appellant still failed to make any payments 
into Court and, in fact, even as of then had never tendered 
h R d t CR 80) Respondents so:·,' any amount w atsoever to espon en s . . 
sequently moved for Summary Judgment foreclosing their mortg:;: 
on the subject property as against Defendant Philip Schamane 
1 
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and reforming the Warranty Deed which they had given to delete 
Gail Schamanek as a grantee. After three continuances were 
granted at the request of Appellant's counsel, this motion 
was granted by the Court and Judgment was entered on September 
5, 1980 (R. 84). Appellant appeals from that portion of the 
Judgment foreclosing Respondents' mortgage. Defendant Gail 
Schamanek did not appeal from that portion of the Judgment 
reforming the Warranty Deed. 
Appellant did not seek to stay enforcement of the 
Summary Judgment and on or about October 14, 1980, the subject 
real property was sold at foreclosure sale for the full amount 
of Appellant's indebtedness (R.98). The period within which 
Appellant could redeem the property expired April 14, 1981, 
and the Sheriff's Sale is now final (Rule 69, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure) . 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN SOLD 
~SHERIFF'S SALE, WHICH SALE HAS BECOME FINAL, THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THIS APPEAL IS MOOT. 
As previously stated, Appellant did not seek to stay 
enforcement of the Trial Court's Judgment and on October 14, 
l98Q, the property was sold at Sheriff's Sale. Pursuant to 
' Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellant had six 
months within which to redeem the subject property from the 
S\eriff' s Sale. He did not do so. Consequently, the Sheriff's 
L - 7 -
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Sale has become final and Appellant has no further right 
title or interest in the subject property. Thus, this app'° I 
by which Appellant seeks to challenge the foreclosing of th; 
mortgage on the subject property has been rendered moot as 
the foreclosure has been completed and title passed pursua,.1 
to Sheriff's Deed. 
II. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS 
TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE NOTICE UTILIZED BY RESPONDENTS OF 
THEIR INTENT TO FORECLOSE THE CONTRACT AS A MORTGAGE. 
Appellant does not dispute that he defaulted under I 
the contract and that in fact the only payment he ever made 
under the contract was the October 1979 payment of $487.70 
Rather, Appellant seeks to find some technical deficiency 
in the notices given to him in order to avoid the consequent:! 
of his almost total failure to comply with his obligations ! 
under the contract. Specifically, Appellant claims that the 
Summary Judgment should be reversed because there is a 
genuine issue of fact as to the sufficiency of the December 
18, 1979 notice given by Respondents of their election to 
accelerate the balance due under the contract and foreclose 
the contract as a mortgage because: 
1. The notices were not mailed to Appellant's 
residence in Las Vegas, Nevada; 
2. . d nd for The December 18 notice included a ema 
Of $48 7 . 70, wher the December monthly payment in the amount 
this payment was allegedly not delinquent; and 
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3, The December 18 notice demanded payment of the 
amount of $86. 00 for fire insurance when the fire insurance 
was allegedly being maintained by Appellant under a separate 
policy. 
For the reasons set forth below, Respondents respect-
fully submit that these contentions lack merit and that the 
notices given were in fact sufficient as a matter of law to 
entitle Respondents to accelerate the remaining balance due 
under the contract and foreclose the contract as a mortgage. 
A. Respondents Were Not Required to Give Appellant 
Any Notice Prior to Commencing a Lawsuit to Foreclose the 
Contract as a Mortgage. 
In the absence of a contractual provision requiring 
notice, no notice need be given by a mortgagee prior to 
accelerating the payments due under a mortgage by virtue of 
the default of the mortgagor. Hallstrom v. Beuhler, 378 
P2d355 (Ut. 1963); Thomas v. Foulger, 264P. 975 (Ut. 1928); 
II SUMMARY OF UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW, pp. 382-383. Thus, the 
only notice requirement in the present case is that contained 
in paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which pro-
vides that: 
l 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the 
terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the 
Buyer to make any payment or payments when the 
same shall become due, or within thirty (30) days 
thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall have 
the following alternative remedies: 
.. ' 
"C. The Seller shall have the right, at his 
option, and u on written notice to the Bu er, to 
declare the entire unpaid a ance hereunder at once 
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due and payable, and may elect to treat this 
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title 
to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immed-
iately to foreclose the same in accordance with 
the laws of the State of Utah. . . " (R. 35) 
(Emphasis added) 
Under this provision, 30 days after Appellant defaulted unq 
I 
the contract by failing to make the various payments requir:i 
thereunder Respondents were entitled to immediately accelt:.1 
the balance owing by simply notifying Appellant that they > .•. 1 
I 
See,~. I 
I 
Rothey v. Stereo-Rama, Inc., 506 P.2d 63 (Ut. 1973); Amerk·I 
-1 
elected to do so and without any prior warning. 
Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Ut. ll~! 
It seems this minimal notice requirement was satisfied wher I 
Appellant was served both with the Complaint and Amended 
I Complaint in this action. 
I 
Moreover, under Utah law it is doubtful that Appello: I 
I 
as an assignee of the Buyer's interest under the Uniform R"-i 
Estate Contract, was entitled to any notice whatsoever even 
if the original Buyer under the contract was entitled to 
notice. Thus, in Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co. , 608 P. 2d 236 
(Ut. 1980), this Court held that the assignee of the Buyer': i 
interest under a Uniform Real Estate Contract was not entid.I 
to any notice of the Seller's election to forfeit the Buyer' i 
interest, whether or not the Seller had actual or construcr: 
notice of the Assignment. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondents sent a 
letter on December 18, 1979 (48 days after the initial defa< 
d r t'·' 
occurred), giving notice that unless the defaults un e ... 
-10-
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I 
.I 
i 
·1 
contract were cured within ten days, Respondents would accelerate 
the entire unpaid balance and foreclose the contract as a 
mor[gage. When Appellant had still not made any payments 30 
days after the initial notice was given, Respondents sent 
a further letter dated January 18, 1980, giving notice that 
Respondents were accelerating the balance due under the contract 
and had elected to foreclose the contract as a mortgage. Cer-
tainly, if Appellant was not entitled to any notice of Respon-
dents' election to foreclose, he cannot complain about the 
alleged technical deficiencies in the notices that were given 
to him. 
B. The Fact That the Notices Were Not Mailed to 
Appellant's Residence Did Not Render the Notices Ineffective. 
Even if Respondents were required to give Appellant 
notice of their election to foreclose the contract as a mort-
gage prior to commencing suit, the fact that both the December 
18, 1979 and January 18, 1980 notices were not sent to 
Appellant's unknown residence in Las Vegas, Nevada, does not 
rmder those notices ineffective. 
In the first place, although Appellant complains about 
the sufficiency of the notices given because they were sent 
to Appellant and Gail Schamanek at Gail's address on Campus 
Drive in Salt Lake City, it is very significant that Appellant 
has ~ claimed that he did not receive these notices or 
that he was prejudiced in any way by the fact that the notices 
..,ere sent to the Salt Lake City address. Furthermore, Gail 
:,:; amanek admitted receiving the notices and never once claimed 
-11-
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in this action that she did not inform Appellant of the 
notices. 
The notices were sent to Philip and Gail Schamanek at 
the Campus Drive address in Salt Lake City because the only 
notice that Respondents received of the Assignment was from a 
third party to the effect that Philip and Gail Schamanek had 
received an Assignment of Contract and that was the address 
on the check for the October payment. In fact, the "Purchase: 
Quit Claim Deed and Assignment of Contract" by which Appellan: 
received his interest in the property on August 31, 1979, 
recited that Appellant's address was 7040 So. Campus Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. This fact alone justifies 
Respondents' sending of the notices to that address. Neither 
Appellant nor anyone else ever informed Respondents of Appellr 
residence address in Las Vegas, where he allegedly moved in 
November 1979, after he had defaulted under the contract. Th 
' i it would have been impossible for Respondents to send notices! 
I 
to Appellant's Las Vegas address. Certainly, if Appellant 1 
expected to receive notices in connection with the contract 
at that address, it was his burden to supply Respondents with 
the necessary information. 
Moreover, it is undisputed from the evidence that at 
the very least Gail Schamanek was acting as Appellant's agent 
with respect to the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the prop( 
covered thereby such that the mailing of the notices to her 
address was certainly sufficient notice under the contract 
-12-
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Gail Schamanek at all times held herself out to Respondents 
as an owner of the property and all the connnunications which 
Respondents had concerning the contract were with Gail 
Schamanek, not Appellant. In fact, after the notices were 
sent out, it was Gail Schamanek who contacted Respondents' 
attorneys respecting the notices. It is also extremely signifi-
cant that it was Gail Schamanek who made the only payment made 
by Appellant to Respondents under the contract and the address 
listed on the check by which payment was made was the Campus 
Drive address in Salt Lake City, to which address the notices 
in relation to the contract were sent by Respondents. Further-
more, the fire insurance policy which was obtained by Appellant 
some time in 1980, also listed Gail Schamanek at the Campus 
Drive address as the insured owner. Under these circumstances, 
it seems somewhat disingenuous for Appellant to complain about 
the fact that the notices in relation to the contract were 
sent to the Campus Drive address. 
Finally, even if Appellant had not received the notices 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit, he certainly received 
notice both when the Complaint and Amended Complaint were 
served. Yet, Appellant still did not tender any money to 
cure the defaults even though he was receiving substantial 
rents from the property. Perhaps, the most compelling evidence 
that Appellant's claim of insufficient notice is and always 
has been a "smoke screen", designed simply to attempt to buy 
-13-
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more time while he tried to come up with the money necessar 
to cure the defaults, is the fact that in June 1980, six 
months after the first notice was sent, at a hearing in the 
District Court on Respondents' Motion for Appointment of a 
Receiver, Appellant's counsel offered to pay into Court all I 
amounts necessary to bring the contract current if the Coun I 
would refuse to appoint a Receiver. Based upon that offer 
and upon the stipulation of Respondents, the Court entered I 
an Order allowing Appellant to pay such funds into Court wit .. I 
20 days. Appellant wholly failed to comply with that Order 
and did not tender one cent into Court. 
C. The Fact That the First Notice Demanded Payment c: 
the December Monthly Payment Does Not Render the Notice 
Insufficient. 
Appellant's argument that the December 18, 1979 notice! 
of default was defective because it included a demand for ttl 
December monthly payment in the amount of $487. 70 when that 1 
payment was allegedly not yet delinquent is similarly unavaL! 
ing. 
In the first place, the December payment was due and 
payable on December 1, 1979, and was in fact delinquent whe:: 
the first notice of default was sent on December 18, 1979 
The fact that paragraph 16 of the contract required Responio • 
to wait for 30 days after a default occurred before accelerc:j 
the balance due under the contract does not mean that a pav::', 
is not delinquent until it is more than 30 days late. This 
fact is clear from paragraph 3 of the contract which spec> 
-14- I 
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provided that a delinquency charge would be made for any 
payment made more than 15 days after the due date. More impor-
tantly, whether or not the December 1, 1979 payment was delin-
qJent at the time the notice was sent is totally irrelevant 
because it is undisputed that at the time the notice was 
sent Appellant was in default because he had not made the 
November payment or paid the taxes due and Appellant did 
not tender to Respondents any of the amounts in default. Further-
mre, Respondents did not actually exercise their election to 
foreclose until their notice of January 18, 1980, at which 
time even the December payment was undisputedly more than 30 
days delinquent, Finally, Appellant never objected to the 
fact that the December 18, 1979 notice included a demand for 
the December payment either when the notice was sent or in 
the Court below and raises this argument for the first time 
on appeal. Appellant does not claim and cannot show that he 
was prejudiced in any way by the inclusion of a demand for 
the December payment. 
D. The Fact That the First Notice Included a Demand 
for the Fire Insurance Premiums Does Not Render the Notice 
Insuff ic ien t . 
The final basis upon which Appellant seeks to invalidate 
the notices sent to him by Respondents, is that the first 
notice of December 18, 1979 included a demand that he reim-
burse Respondents for a fire insurance premium of $86. 00, which 
they had been required to pay. Appellant, again, makes this 
~lairn for the first time on appeal on the basis that he was 
-15-
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allegedly already paying fire insurance in December of 191\ 
under a different policy. 
Pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, Appellant was required to maintain insurance on 
the property, to assign the insurance policy to Respondents 
to the extent of their interest in the property, and to de!:· 
a copy of the insurance policy to Respondents. There is 
absolutely no evidence in the record to substantiate Appel· 
lant 's contention, made for the first time before this Cour: 
that he already had fire insurance on the property in Decel!: 
of 1979 under a different policy for which he had already 
paid the premium. Furthermore, Appellant does not even con· 
tend, and there is certainly no evidence in the record to si 
that Appellant had assigned that insurance policy to Respon· 
dents to the extent of their interest or delivered a copy o' 
the policy to them. More importantly, Appellant never objec: 
to the fact that a demand for fire insurance was included ir 
the notice and such demand certainly didn't prejudice 
Appellant because he didn't tender any of the amounts in 
default. 
Thus, Respondents respectfully submit that the notic: 
given Appellant were more than sufficient to entitle them t. 
I 
avail themselves of the remedy provided by paragraph 16C I 
of the contract to accelerate the entire balance und~ t~ ! 
As Appt.I contract and foreclose the contract as a mortgage. 
lant admittedly was in default under the contract, no genui:I 
and the Dl.. stri.· ct Court proo,:i issue of material fact existed 
-16-
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granted Summary Judgment. FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 
404 P.2d 670 (Ut. 1965); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Ut. 1973). 
III. RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL. 
Under paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(R.35), Respondents are entitled to recover all attorneys' 
fees incurred in pursuing any remedy provided for by the 
contract. Consequently, Respondents respectfully submit that 
they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees incurred on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant made one payment of $487.70 in October 1979 
and then admittedly defaulted under the contract between the 
parties by not making any further payments notwithstanding 
the fact that Appellant was receiving substantial rents from 
the property and Respondents were required to continue making 
monthly payments of $370.00 on an underlying Trust Deed encum-
bering the property. Even though Respondents were probably 
not required to give any notice to Appellant prior to instituting 
a foreclosure action, Respondents did in fact give Appellant two 
separate notices and gave him substantially more time than 
-17-
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required by law to cure the defaults prior to electing to 
foreclose the mortgage. These notices were sent to the 
address listed by Appellant on the Assignment he received. 
Appellant does not deny that he received these notices or 
contend that he suffered any prejudice whatsoever because of 
the address to which the notices were sent or the form of the 
notices. The Trial Court, recognizing these facts, refused 
to be a party to Appellant's efforts to further delay this 
matter and entered Summary Judgment. Pursuant to that Judg· 
ment, the subject property was sold at Sheriff's Sale a~ 
Appellant failed to redeem the property within the six month; 
allowed by law. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's 
determination was correct that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists with respect to this action and that the Judgment 
should either be affirmed or the appeal dismissed because the 
subject of the appeal has been rendered moot. 
DATED this 7~ day of May, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BURBIDGE. MABEY & MITCHELL 
By ~ - Cv\vGli&-s~ .f MITCHELL . ; 
438 East 200 South, su4ir1;1· Salt Lake City, Utah 8 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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